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Abstract: In the light of Germany’s chosen path towards the energy transition, the regulatory
framework has changed considerably. New players have succeeded in entering the market,
and renewable energies have become increasingly competitive. Greater electrification of the transport
and heating sectors will be needed in the future to achieve national climate targets. Against this
background, Germany’s big energy companies need to be sure that their sales will increase. However,
they were unable to anticipate this development, and made strategic mistakes in the past. The
development of sustainable business models in line with the energy transition failed to materialize.
Now it is becoming increasingly clear that companies must create new business models to survive
in the long term. These business models have to keep with the tradition, whilst meeting the needs
of low-carbon power supplies. In this paper, we will examine the past and future challenges of the
four energy companies and develop a proposal for evaluating sustainable business models. For this
purpose, we use the multi-level perspective to categorize developments in the electricity market over
the last 50 years, and then apply a multi-criteria analysis to derive five suitable business models from
the results.
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1. Introduction
For many years, the regime of the German electricity sector was characterized by oligopolistic and
monopolistic structures. For a long time, Germany’s power sector was more or less dominated by the
country’s four biggest power companies: E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and Vattenfall, referred to collectively as
Germany’s “Big 4”. Founded after the liberalization of the German electricity market in 1998, these four
companies had a market share of more than 80%; figures for 2005 show that the two largest companies
(RWE AG and E.ON AG) had a market share of 54% (see Table 1) [1].
Table 1. Electricity generation capacity and market share of Germany’s four big energy providers in
2005 [1].
Company Capacity (MW) Market Share (%)
RWE Power AG 29,124 27.5
E.ON Energie AG 28,547 26.9
Vattenfall Europe AG 15,349 14.5
EnBW AG 11,119 10.5
Total for the Big 4 84,139 79.4
Total for Germany 105,970 100
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These four companies, the result of several mergers since the liberalization of the electricity
market, had a long history and a traditional generation portfolio based mainly on fossil fuels and
nuclear energy. Furthermore, two of the companies (RWE and Vattenfall) relied heavily on lignite,
the most CO2-intensive fossil fuel. In a nutshell, the business models of Germany’s Big 4 were
traditionally based on non-renewables. On account of their power plant portfolio and in the face
of climate change concerns, the approach taken by the Big 4 to even out their carbon account relied
heavily on nuclear energy and on improving the eciency rate of existing power plants, combined
with a limited investment in renewable energies. Furthermore, they advocated carbon capture and
storage (CCS) via EURELECTRIC, the association representing the interests of the electricity industry
in Europe [2]. These strategic decisions turned out to be insucient. The notion of business models for
the energy industry dates back to the mid-20th century [3], but has grown significantly in importance
since the liberalization of the energy industry [4].
Soon after 2005, a gradual and then more rapid downward trend set in: as of 2016, the market shares
of the Big 4’s electricity generation declined towards 50%. In addition, not only the contribution from
conventional generation to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)
(see Table 2), but also the share prices of the companies fell substantially (see Figure 1).
Table 2. Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) contribution from
conventional power generation [1].
EBITDA 2009 Tendency EBITDA 2017
E.ON 10.8% ! 11.1%
RWE 34.8% & 25.1%
EnBW 74.3% & 17.8%
Vattenfall 71.8% & 15.4%
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Figure 1. evelop ent of the share price of er any’s top three energy co panies.
How does a conventional business model dier from an innovative business model? Doleski
(2016) divides the transformation of the energy industry into four historical stages that illustrate the
epochal process of change in the energy industry from monopolistic utilities to digital energy service
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companies. In the first stage, extensive electrification was established under monopoly conditions with
the implementation of transmission and local distribution grids. This phase lasted more or less over a
hundred years, from the discovery of the electrodynamic principle and the beginning of electrification
in the 19th century to the liberalization of the market in 1998. Competition set in after liberalization.
This second stage, which according to Doleski, lasted until 2012 [5], focused on price competition.
These first two stages form the core of a conventional business model. At the heart of the strategy
is the ability to generate electricity at low cost by exploiting economies of scale in large power plants in
a bid to possess a competitive price advantage.
Doleski suggests two additional stages post-2012. This third stage, characterized by a stronger
service orientation, changes utility companies into a service companies with a clear focus on customer
needs. The fourth stage, post-2015, involves this service orientation being mainly underpinned by
digital solutions [5]. In our understanding, these two stages are the core of an innovative business
model. It is apparent that large incumbents have an advantage over their smaller competitors,
especially in conventional business areas where size and financial capacity are the key factors [6].
In contrast, customer knowledge and customer proximity are advantages in innovative business fields.
Decentralized structures then become more advantageous than centralized structures.
Against this background of the growing importance of services, E.ON announced a strategic
organizational step in 2015. E.ON’s fossil fuel and nuclear generation was to be carried out by a
new company called Uniper, while the original E.ON was to concentrate on renewables, electricity
distribution networks, and customer service. In April 2016, RWE took a similar step, and founded an
aliate “Innogy SE” to focus on renewable energies. Just two years later, however, these strategic
organizational decisions were reversed: RWE and E.ON decided to continue as a future electricity
company without grids and consumers (RWE) and a power distributor without power plants (E.ON).
With the approval of the Federal Cartel Oce, RWE and E.ON are currently intending to divide
business fields among themselves [7]. This is as an indication of the disruptive processes prevailing in
the energy industry [8,9]. This management decision shows that the energy transition is subject to
significant change dynamics.
One of the conclusions drawn from this is that the process of transforming the energy system
has a significant impact on the structure of the energy industry in Germany. Transformation of the
energy supply to 100% renewable energy sources and much better energy eciency will bring about a
considerable structural change in business. At the same time, the expansion of renewable energies
in Germany also leads to the need to think in terms of the European electricity grid. The technical
possibilities for exporting electricity to Germany’s neighboring countries are limited [10]. Energy
services that simultaneously contribute to grid stability are therefore a particularly great challenge in
the context of the energy transition. The processes of decentralization, digitalization, decarbonization,
and democratization associated with transforming the energy system not only have a considerable
impact on the actor constellation and the socio-technical systems of the energy sector, they also change
the core of established energy companies and their self-image. It is becoming increasingly apparent
that conventional business models that have enjoyed great economic and social success for many
decades are no longer sustainable. New business models are needed to take advantage of the economic
opportunities oered by the energy transition. Developments such as the ongoing digitalization of the
energy sector and the need to provide flexible power generation capacity opens up opportunities for
novel and innovative business models [3].
Against this background, Giehl et al. (2019) provided an excellent overview and classification
of sustainable business models in the context of the energy transition. In their study “Full inclusion
and classification of business models of the energy system transformation”, the authors systematically
evaluated and analyzed a large number of business models [8,9], developing in the process a solid
overview of energy-related business models for further analysis. A total of 242 business models
were identified based on a collection of primary data concerning 134 companies from the energy
industry. Literature analysis involved evaluating 166 thematically relevant publications, resulting in
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the identification of 396 theory-based business models. It would go beyond the scope of this paper
to analyze all these business models. Instead, we undertake a detailed analysis of five exemplary
business models from dierent sectors (transport, households/buildings, and industry) and all relevant
areas (power generation, grid, and retail).
Doing business in the energy sector has generally become more dicult. It takes more than
generating and selling kilowatt hours to implement a successful business strategy, as practiced by the
energy industry in the last millennium in the absence of competition or service orientation. Following
on from the monopoly market (utility strategy 1.0), the competitive market (utility strategy 2.0) and the
service market (utility strategy 3.0), digital solutions are increasingly at the forefront of strategically
important business models (utility strategy 4.0) [3,5]. Innovative business models in the power supply
market are promising if they take into account the perspective of thinking along with the customer [3].
In this context, services will also become much more important in the sector coupling market [11],
particularly the integration of e-mobility into the existing electricity infrastructure [12]. Scientific
studies have already been conducted on the strategic planning of sustainability at the local level in
general [13] and on the importance of municipal energy utilities in particular [14]. Our analysis focuses
on strategies for large energy companies—the incumbents—whose economic success is particularly
important for many employees.
The aim of our paper is to enrich the discussion on the analysis of sustainable business models for
the energy industry and to propose how to assess them. After an introduction and a presentation of
the multi-method approach, this paper looks at the contextual circumstances or framework conditions
that arose by the end of the last millennium in the rise and fall of the Big 4 [15]. Using the multi-level
perspective (MLP), the paper focuses on the key conditions or factors that, together, have overthrown
the (conventional) business models of the Big 4 (Section 3). This analysis is complemented by
(multi-criteria) analysis of potential business models for electricity suppliers, which are not endangered
by current framework conditions (Section 4). The paper ends with concluding remarks and avenues
for future research.
2. Methods
The multi-level perspective (MLP) is applied to categorize the latest developments in the German
electricity sector [16]. The MLP is a model that divides transformative developments into socio-technical
landscapes, regimes, and niche innovations, and reveals the interdependent relationships between
these levels. Niche actors anticipate future development trends and use windows of opportunities to
act as “pioneer[s] of change” [17]. The multi-level perspective, essentially fleshed out and theoretically
elaborated by Frank Geels [16], is a theory that emphasizes the inextricable interdependencies between
technological, economic, political, and cultural processes of change.
So far, the model has mainly focused on transformations in large socio-technical systems. Geels
himself focuses on a wide range of change processes, from the replacement of horse-drawn carriages
by cars [18] in the transport sector to the breakthrough of rock ‘n’ roll [19] in music. Other authors
have transferred this theory to other fields, such as urban development [20], electric mobility [21,22],
and comprehensive approaches to enshrine social sustainability in global production networks [23].
The key assumptions behind these case studies are as follows:
 Radical innovations first develop in niches that are still largely outside the general sphere of
perception and supported by a small number of individual, collective, or corporate actors.
 These niches are closely related to given socio-technical regimes.
 The regime is characterized by consolidated actor constellations, rules, and conventions, as well
as economic and technical structures.
 Niche innovations sometimes lead to changes in the regime, which in turn influence developments
in the niche.
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 The socio-technical regimes, in turn, are embedded in more permanent overarching framework
conditions, which Geels (2002) calls the landscape.
 The landscape includes all those dynamics that cannot be directly influenced by the actors
involved. These are, for example, fundamental trends such as globalization, climate change,
and digitalization.
We suggest that an analysis using the overview approach provided by the MLP may provide
valuable insights to our understanding of how changes in the energy landscape have aected the
German regime of electricity companies. However, as “an abstract analytical framework that identifies
relations between general theoretical principles and mechanisms,” [24] it cannot be used to study
specific details of the processes and interactions that occur during the transition. Complementary
theories are therefore needed to operationalize the MLP [25]. MLP analysis is fed and substantiated
by the results of a previous study on the rise and fall of electricity companies, which made use of
triangulation (involving expert interviews, participatory observations at two ocial company events
(annual general meetings), and interviews with representatives from the four companies).
Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) is another methodological approach applied in this paper. MCA is
used to assess business models in Section 4. MCA is a common approach that goes beyond traditional
schemes with a limited focus (such as the economic focus of traditional cost-benefit analysis) [26]. The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines MCA as “a type of
decision analysis tool that is particularly applicable in cases where a single-criterion approach falls
short” [27].
For the purpose of this paper, five business models will be analyzed in detail. Five criteria were
defined to assess the future viability of these five business models. The criteria, selected from the
energy companies’ point of view, were defined as follows:
 In accordance with climate targets and policy strategies.
 Wide acceptance by clients/size of potential customer base.
 Low costs for the energy company.
 Fast implementation rate.
 Highly competitive.
The criteria were then operationalized by drawing up a ranking list. For visualization purposes,
arrows ("%!&#) are used to illustrate positive, neutral, and negative eects. The up arrow symbolizes
that the business model fulfills the criterion; the down arrow means that the criterion is not met.
An arrow to the right means a neutral evaluation. This may mean that the assessment is highly
dependent on the design and implementation of the business model or that parts of the criterion
are met and other parts are not. For example, in the case of the criterion “Low costs for the energy
company”, an arrow pointing upwards means that the company incurs low costs to implement this
business model. An arrow pointing downwards means that costs are high. An arrow to the right
means that costs may vary depending on preconditions and implementation.
The assessment, based on literature analysis and status quo analysis, was then determined by
the authors of this paper. Since it was not possible to comprehensively assess the criteria within the
scope of this paper, the results merely represent a first, broad evaluation of the potentials of dierent
business models.
3. Using the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP)
3.1. Central Results
The MLP enables us to identify factors that resulted in a transformation of the regime. Some
of these central factors that tend to act at the “landscape level” are highlighted below, with a brief
explanation of the role they play in the transformation of the regime.
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Considering the “landscape” perspective of the MLP, the Renewable Energy Sources Act
(German: Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) implemented in 2000 had a significant influence on the
further development of the energy system. The graph in Figure 2 shows that electricity generation
from renewable energy sources gradually increased following the introduction of the Renewable
Energy Sources Act in 2000, whereas electricity generation by the Big 4—and hence their market
shares—decreased. These trends show that renewable energies were successfully promoted,
representing the beginning of the end of conventional energy sources.Energies 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 17 
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The Big 4 encountered another problem. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), implemented in
2005, is an important European instrument for mitigating climate change, and has become increasingly
relevant for power generation. Since 2013, for instance, power plant operators have had to purchase
100% of their certificates, because it has been shown in the past that “they have been able to pass on
the notional cost of allowances to customers even when they received them for free” [29]. Substantial
reforms have been undertaken in this area since the start of the third trading round of the ETS from
2013 to 2020, which also resulted in a higher certificate price of around ¿25 per ton of CO2. The
forthcoming reform of the European Emissions Trading Scheme could further reduce the profitability
of emission-intensive power plants in the medium term [30]. For example, the auction procedure is
to become the dominant distribution mechanism. By 2027 at the latest, free allocations should have
expired completely. It is evident that the profitability of conventional power plants based on fossil
fuels will decline [31].
A ore stringent i ple entation of the greenhouse gas (GHG) neutrality concept by the iddle
of the century depends on a 95% reduction in GHG e issions by 2050 and hence align ent with the
upper argin of the target range specified by the Federal Government of Germany in its 2010 “Energy
Concept” for GHG emission reductions. Figure 3 shows that the 55% reduction trajectory for GHG
emissions by 2030 and the 70% reduction by 2040 (the Federal Government’s interim targets) will not
result in a 95% reduction in GHGs in 2050. To achieve this objective, the reduction target for 2030
would have to be closer to 58% or 59%. Given this background, there have been justified calls for an
adjustment of interim targets.
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It is essential to immediately begin a rapid reduction in CO2 and other GHG emissions. This
is why the Intergovern ental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recently estimated that halving CO2
emissions by 2030 (relative to 2010 levels) and globally achieving net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050 (as
well as strong reductions in other greenhouse gases) would oer a 50% chance of staying below 1.5 C
warming [32].
Given that industrialized countries produced more of and benefited more from emissions in the
past, they have a ethical responsibility to achieve this transition more rapidly than the world as a
whole. The EU and Germany have set themselves ambitious climate targets: annual GHG emissions
are to fall by 80–95% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. Interi targets have been set for 2020 and
2030. Targets must be seen in the light of the results of the climate conference in Paris. At the end
of 2015, the global community agreed to t e goal of a net-zero emissions global economy between
2050 and 2100. Large parts of the transport and heati g sectors must be electrified (sector coupli g) to
achieve national climate targets. This is because electricity from renewable energies plays a decisive
role in decarbonizing these areas. Battery technologies and water electrolysis have the potential to
become key elements in coupling the electricity, transport, heating, and chemical sectors in a future
sustainable energy system [33].
Although it is foreseeable that electricity will play an increasing role in energy supply, there is no
gold-rus mood among the large electricity companies. On the contrary, the mood in the companies
and on t e st ck arket shows that the incumbents must quickly correct their strategic mistakes
from past decades to maintain their market position. Companies ave problems at all stages of
the value chain. A major problem exists in the area of power generation: large companies’ most
i p rtant generation facilities are conventional power plants. However, the increasing temporary
underutilization of conventional power plants when wind and solar plants operate at full c pacity
is causing the margins generated by co ventional generation to collapse. Figure 4 illustrates the
enormous increase in importance of renew ble energi s in electricity generation.
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Incidentally, as a technological option for incumbents to maintain their fossil fuel portfolio, CCS is
rather unlikely to happen, at least in Germany [34,35].
Finally, the economic outlook for coal-fired power generation is bleak not only because of the
forthcoming changes to the emissions trading system and the increasing share of renewable energies,
but also because there is a broad political and social consensus on phasing out coal. The German
Coal Commission appointed by the Federal Government includes 31 representatives from political
decision-makers, the energy sector, lignite mining regions, industry, environmental associations, trade
unions, the scientific community, and the government. The commission presented its final report in
early 2019. It recommends phasing out coal-fired power generation by 2038. The energy companies
therefore expect deep cuts. Even if the regions receive structural aid and the companies are awarded
compensation, which is likely, an end to these conventional business models is foreseeable. This
gives rise to the problem that few precautions have been taken as yet to develop business models of
comparable importance that are in consensus on the energy transition.
3.2. Overview
In the previous section, we identified various factors that had a significant influence on the
“landscape” and have overthrown the Big 4’s conventional business models. In a nutshell, these were
the introduction of the EEG in 2000, the ETS in 2005, and the Energy Concept in 2010 in combination
with (international) debates on GHG emission reductions, an all-electric society, and the coal phase-out.
While market liberalization facilitated the dominance of the Big 4, (international) debates on climate
change, CO2, and the coal phase-out questioned the use of fossil fuels. Moreover, large parts of the
German population had doubts about nuclear energy. These sentiments and the Fukushima accident
jeopardized nuclear energy’s reputation. These landscape factors resulted in policy change and an
all-electric society paradigm. These factors contributed to the expansion of renewables, which was not
pushed by the Big 4, but by a large number of smaller actors. The following figure, based on the basic
model of Geels’ Multi-Level Perspective (2002), presents an overview of the key influences, some of
which have been discussed above.
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The development described here gives rise to an important strategic question, which we want to
pursue in the context of this paper: What potential business models can large companies adopt in the
context of a consistent further development of the energy transition? In this context and in accordance
with MLP terminology, niche innovations are crucial. Many of these niches already play or will play a
decisive role in the future and influence the socio-technical regime. It is therefore important for the Big
4 to take a closer look at these niche products and examine them as potential future business models.
Some of these innovative business models are shown in the orange box in Figure 5, and will be further
analyzed in the following section.
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4. Outlook on Sustainable Business Models
The Big 4 cannot continue business as usual because of the German energy transition. They must
rethink their conventional business models and create new, sustainable strategies to survive on the
market and generate future profit. There are several opportunities for companies to discover new areas
and to develop niche markets. Five of these niche innovations are mentioned in the table at the bottom
right of Figure 5.
For further analysis, these business models will be reviewed in detail. When selecting the business
models, care was taken to capture a broad picture of business models and to map all sectors (transport,
households/buildings, and industry). Analysis also included all relevant energy-related areas (power
generation, grid, and retail).
The five selected business models and the sector they represent are listed in Table 3. All five are
then briefly presented, including status quo analysis. The perspectives of these business models for
the Big 4 will then be assessed using multi-criteria analysis, as described above.
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Table 3. Business models and how they aect the core areas of big energy companies.
Business Model Sector
1. Rollout of public infrastructure for e-mobility Transport
2. Supply of system solutions (PV, storage, management software) Buildings
3. Dynamic electricity pricing for companies Industry
4. Digitalization—demand side: smart home Households
5. Digitalization—supply side: virtual power plants Industry/supply side
4.1. Rollout of Public Infrastructure for E-Mobility
In the field of infrastructure development for e-mobility, a study by PWC (2018) on energy providers
found that German energy companies manufacture (12%), sell (68%), install, and maintain (88%)
charging stations [36]. By the end of 2018, more than 16,000 public charging points had been installed
in Germany. A total of 76% of these stations for charging electric vehicles in Germany (and Austria)
are operated by energy companies, approximately 25% of which by the RWE subsidiary Innogy.
Despite these activities, there are still too few charging points, and energy providers are hesitant
to invest in this area. The lack of sucient charging infrastructure is considered to be one of the key
reasons why consumers decide against purchasing a battery electric vehicle (BEV).
One of the main reasons for investing even more in the expansion of electric mobility infrastructure
are the targets and strategies of the Federal Government. Targets were set for expanding charging
infrastructure (and BEVs), and financial incentives are available for the purchase of electric vehicles.
Consequently, e-mobility will probably play a role in the future. In addition, the business model
is highly compatible with government strategies, even though electric vehicles are not completely
emission-free due to Germany’s electricity mix. More BEVs are likely to be purchased as the number of
public (and private) charging stations grows, increasing customer interest. However, this will probably
not occur in the short term. It must also be noted that other technology solutions (e.g., hydrogen) may
contest the acceptance of BEVs.
Dierent factors are relevant to costs and the implementation rate of this business model, making
it impossible to make a general statement about its viability. For instance, the energy companies’
experience in installing and operating charging stations plays an important role. In general, PWC
(2018) shows that larger companies invest more in this field due to their (i) capacity to finance larger
(infrastructure) investments, (ii) human resources, and (iii) ability to test and promote innovative
projects [36]. This is also the reason why larger energy companies are in the best position to facilitate
e-mobility infrastructure. However, the emergence of Elli, a subsidiary of Volkswagen, shows that
financially sound competitors from other sectors are also seeking to provide charging services for BEVs.
Initially, the maintenance of charging stations deviates substantially from conventional business
models, while their operation resembles the original picture. Innogy does not regard the sale of
electricity for electric vehicles as a profitable business segment overall. In the field of e-mobility, the
company sees the business segment rather as a supplier of technology and an operator of charging
points [37]. In contrast, companies like Shell seem to be increasingly interested in the market.
Charge-Point, a group operating 60,000 charging stations in the USA, is now also entering the European
market. Based on this, an assessment of this business model was made, which is illustrated in Table 4.
Table 4. Assessment of rolling out public infrastructure for e-mobility as a business model for
energy companies.
In Accordance
with Climate
Targets and Policy
Strategies
Wide Acceptance
by Clients/Size of
Potential
Customer Base
Low Costs for the
Energy Company
Fast
Implementation
Rate
Highly
Competitive
" ! & & %
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4.2. Supply of System Solutions
This business model comprises the provision of system solutions, particularly for the residential
sector (buildings). One example of such a system solution is a photovoltaic system together with
a storage device and energy management software. The advantage of such system solutions is
that customers must no longer occupy themselves with the individual components, but can rely on
individual products fitting perfectly together. The use of such an integrated service can be considered
an advantage from the homeowner point of view because it substantially reduces transaction costs
(e.g., in the search for information about solar PV and battery storage technologies, qualified and
available craft businesses). A study by EY and EWI (2016) estimates the theoretical market potential
for battery storage to be ¿500 million over the next five years [38].
It may therefore be an option for energy companies to develop a business model that concentrates
mainly on the sale of such system solutions. In the process, the energy provider would have to
cooperate with a battery manufacturer, among others, and regional craft businesses would install the
solar PV systems.
The energy company E.ON sells both solar systems and wall boxes via its website, i.e., private
charging points that can be installed in the garage, for example. Regional sales structures are used,
integrating regional and local partners. Innogy takes a similar approach, but also oers to install
battery storage units.
While energy eciency is not an issue, such a business model is in line with renewable energy
(and battery storage) expansion requirements. Regarding acceptance by clients, customers have the
advantage that they no longer need to search for single components. However, some customers may
not welcome out-of-the-box solutions because they might want to use other (e.g., more advanced or
cheaper) technology providers.
The business idea diers substantially from the original business model of energy companies
because it facilitates energy self-reliance (reduction of external energy demand) and requires the
development of new retail structures, bonding with other companies, and in-depth cooperation with
craft businesses. Addressing potential customers is another issue that is considered as challenging.
From a cost and implementation rate point of view, therefore, this new business model may
require substantial eort. Competitors include providers of similar integrated solutions including, e.g.,
Germany-based sonnen GmbH or the US company Tesla as well as providers of singular technologies
(e.g., Panasonic). It is unclear whether energy providers will be able to compete with these innovative
businesses. As a result of our analysis, the following Table 5 summarises the assessment of this
business model.
Table 5. Assessment of supplying system solutions as a business model for energy companies.
In Accordance
with Climate
Targets and Policy
Strategies
Wide Acceptance
by Clients/Size of
Potential
Customer Base
Low Costs for the
Energy Company
Fast
Implementation
Rate
Highly
Competitive
" ! & & # !
4.3. Dynamic Electricity Pricing for Companies
Dynamic electricity prices react to temporal fluctuations in electricity prices, which are passed
on to customers. In this context, there is potential for industry to reduce energy costs and to shift
production to periods when load shifting is needed from the electricity system perspective. In turn,
this oers opportunities to better integrate renewables into the grid (that is, electricity supply could
guide production). Some pilot projects already exist, such as the municipal utility “Wuppertaler
Stadtwerke”, which participated in a research project for realizing an innovative electricity price
structure for medium-sized industrial companies [39]. Another pilot project, “Happy Power Hour
II”, aims to develop a dynamic electricity tari that passes on electricity price fluctuations to large
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industrial customers [39]. The aim is to (i) directly reduce the procurement costs of electricity for
industrial companies, (ii) stimulate systemic behavior, and (iii) indirectly avoid energy bottlenecks.
Although several pilot projects exist, industry in Germany usually purchases electricity based on
long-term contracts with static electricity prices. At first sight, therefore, industry has no incentive to
change production habits.
The assessment of the business model includes both positive and negative aspects. Given that
load shifting, for which dynamic electricity pricing is necessary, allows the integration of increasing
renewables, a new pricing regime is completely in line with government targets. Industry clients are
interested because they want to cut electricity costs; at the same time, however, companies need to
determine their load-shifting potential. There are, of course, also limits. From an electricity company’s
point of view, the cost of adopting such a business model should be relatively low, but (hardware)
investments must be made at both ends, the supply and the demand side. The implementation rate
also depends on the interest of a critical mass of industry players. Table 6 illustrates the assessment of
the business model.
Table 6. Assessment of dynamic electricity pricing for companies as a business model for
energy companies.
In Accordance
with Climate
Targets and Policy
Strategies
Wide Acceptance
by Clients/Size of
Potential
Customer Base
Low Costs for the
Energy Company
Fast
Implementation
Rate
Highly
Competitive
" ! ! & %
4.4. Digitalization—the Demand Side: Smart Home
According to the Smart Home Report 2019 [40], utility companies are seen as potential market
leaders for the smart home market. The potential for this business model is huge. According to the
Statista Digital Market Outlooks, at least one smart home application is currently in use in 6.1 million
German households. This figure is expected to rise to 13.5 million by 2023 [40].
Smart home applications are gaining ground in both building technologies and household
appliances/lighting [41,42]. The greatest potential in Germany lies in heating control. In addition,
smart meters are essential when implementing a smart home [43]. Intelligent smart home solutions
can provide consumers with a visualization of their energy consumption, which can be continuously
recorded and evaluated. Energy companies could benefit from this development by providing
smart home technologies, hosting applications, developing useful mobile phone apps, and providing
customer care and training.
Smart home technologies do not necessarily reduce energy consumption, but energy automatic
control and visualization may contribute to the climate targets. Overall, the climate mitigation factor is
assessed positively. However, devices that must be purchased additionally may also consume electricity.
As the market for smart home technologies grows, acceptance by clients will also increase,
even considering data security concerns. Smart home applications are already oered by a number
of energy companies. Almost all major energy companies currently oer a range of smart home
applications. Only the scope and focus of the smart home devices vary from company to company.
E.ON, for example, oers solutions in the areas of heating, security, and lighting. For applications,
E.ON cooperates with well-known brands such as Bosch, nest, and Philips. E.ON also oers packages
of dierent products. In contrast, Vattenfall additionally focuses on entertainment and lifestyle, and
also cooperates with well-known brands. Products oered by Innogy do not dier significantly from
those of the other energy companies. However, innogy relies on its own system. RWE has also
been referring customers to innogy’s smart home segment since 2016. Besides large energy supply
companies, other energy supply companies (such as EWE, Pfalzwerke AG) also oer smart home
technologies for private households.
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Due to their experience in the smart home market, the cost for energy companies should be low
and the implementation rate fast. However, it must be noted that some energy companies have already
abandoned their smart home business models because the online sales model, entailing relatively high
initial investment, did not appeal to customers. In order to survive on the market and to compete
against other providers, energy companies need to oer customers easy-to-understand information,
compatible solutions, service packages, and competitive prices. One conceivable option would be
subsidy models. In this case, the energy supplier would make advance payments to install the hardware
in the household, and then monetize the customer relationship in the long term. Subscription models
with regular payments, reducing customers’ initial investment, are another option. On the basis of our
analysis, an assessment of this business model was made, which is illustrated in Table 7.
Table 7. Assessment of the smart home as a business model for energy companies.
In Accordance
with Climate
Targets and Policy
Strategies
Wide Acceptance
by Clients/Size of
Potential
Customer Base
Low Costs for the
Energy Company
Fast
Implementation
Rate
Highly
Competitive
% !% % % !
4.5. Digitalization—the Supply Side: Virtual Power Plants
Virtual power plants aggregate decentralized energy resources, including both volatile (e.g., solar
PV, wind) and flexible (e.g., biogas, CHP, hydro) producers. Some virtual power plants also aggregate
energy consumers if they have load-shifting potential. Actors with storage capacities can also be
aggregated. The headquarters of the virtual power plant coordinates production, consumption, and
storage so that electricity supply and demand are relatively balanced [44].
Virtual power plants enable the integration of renewable energies and storage into the electricity
system, which is central for the energy transition. Clients on the demand side will accept the system as
long as virtual power plants do not become cost drivers and do not have a negative impact on the
overall electricity system. Clients on the supply side ought to be interested in being aggregated in
order to lower the (transaction) cost of selling electricity on the market. Setting up a virtual power
plant deviates from the original business model of operating conventional power plants. The cost and
implementation rate of realizing this shift also depends on the type of actors involved in the virtual
power plant (decentralized energy produces, end users, storage providers). For instance, the company
Next Kraftwerke aggregates around 7000 units with a networked capacity of 6000 MW. The consultancy
Frost and Sulivan expects the market for virtual power plants to rise by 14% annually by 2022 [45],
with smaller companies currently being the market leaders (e.g., Next Kraftwerke, Energy2Market,
Statkraft, sonnen GmbH). Taking into account the dierent aspects, the assessment of this business
model is as follows (see Table 8).
Table 8. Assessment of virtual power plants as a business model for energy companies.
In Accordance
with Climate
Targets and Policy
Strategies
Wide Acceptance
by Clients/Size of
Potential
Customer Base
Low Costs for the
Energy Company
Fast
Implementation
Rate
Highly
Competitive
" ! ! & %
4.6. Comparison of the Five Business Models
The five examples demonstrate dierent options for withdrawing from conventional business
models and surviving on the market. The business models described are just a selection of the options
available, and could be extended by a number of further models. The assessment shows that each
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business model has its advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless, individual companies should
examine and test the feasibility of each business model.
The aim of the evaluation was not to provide energy companies with a perfectly designed
roadmap for the future, but to formulate options. The Table 9 summarizes the assessment of all five
business models.
Table 9. Assessment of all business models—an overview.
In Accordance with
Climate Targets and
Policy Strategies
Wide Acceptance by
Clients/Size of Potential
Customer Base
Low Costs for
the Energy
Company
Fast
Implementation
Rate
Highly
Competitive
Rollout of public
infrastructure for
e-mobility
" ! & ! %
Supply of system
solutions " ! & &# !
Dynamic electricity
pricing for companies " ! ! & %
Smart home " !% & % !
Virtual power plants " ! ! & %
The assessment demonstrates that all business models comply with climate targets and policy
strategies, and may contribute to the transition of the energy system. Risks include the (initial)
investment, which may be very high. Competitors on the market must also be analyzed before deciding
whether it is possible to exploit the (gap in the) market.
5. Conclusions and Outlook
Speaking in MLP terminology, this article introduces changes in the electricity sector regime in
Germany. Between 2009 and 2017, conventional electricity generation in Germany declined from 501
to 437 TWh, i.e., by 64 TWh. This decline primarily aects the incumbents of the German electricity
sector. Their decline amounted to 92 TWh over the same period. Thus, the Big 4’s decline in earnings
has resulted in margin eects (spreads) in the conventional sector. The shares of major German
energy companies have fallen sharply in value, and economic fundamentals are deteriorating. In 2009,
conventional generation in Germany was the core business of Germany’s Big 4 energy companies. Now,
however, this sector is experiencing an economic crisis. In the meantime, the earnings contribution is
considerably lower and will continue to decline as the energy transition progresses.
The MLP approach helped us to identify central influencing factors on the landscape level that
facilitated the fall of the Big 4. While the prevailing (and socially acceptable) principles that electricity
supply had to be primarily safe and favorably priced facilitated oligopolistic or monopolistic structures,
the changing landscape started to turn those principles upside down. Even before the Fukushima
disaster, other incidents could have cast doubts on this business model (e.g., the German anti-nuclear
movement of the 1980s, the Renewable Energy Sources Act (feed-in tari) of 2000, or the government’s
Energy Concept 2010). Apparently, however, these signals were not strong enough or were too isolated
to create sucient demand for a change in the electricity sector regime. Now, however, change is
necessary, together with new sustainable business strategies and profitable business models.
Five potential business models for electricity companies were therefore assessed in the second
part of this paper. In MLP terminology, e-mobility infrastructure, home system solutions, dynamic
electricity pricing, the smart home, and virtual power plants can be considered niche innovations. The
assessment factored in five criteria; apart from climate policy compatibility, these were acceptance,
cost, implementation rate, and competitiveness. All business models have their pros and cons. Some
insights are worth mentioning: for instance, the example of the virtual power plant shows that
start-ups can succeed in capturing relevant business ideas (e.g., Next Kraftwerke). However, while
start-ups must always contest big companies, the e-mobility example shows that current changes in
the electricity landscape also allow companies from other sectors (e.g., transport) to become strong
competitors. Such new competitors need not be financially under-resourced, like most start-ups; they
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may have the investment capacity required to finance capital-intensive assets. Both the supply of
system solutions and smart home technology suggest that electricity companies can benefit from their
traditional activities, owing to their long-term relationships with electricity consumers. Innovative
solutions could, for instance, be paid via a premium on electricity taris, so that customers need not
pay the potentially high cost upfront.
The MLP can be considered a useful tool for structuring external influencing factors on business
models over time. A comparative analysis of dierent types of incumbents could also help to
identify cross-sectoral influencing factors that contest conventional business models of incumbents
from dierent sectors (electricity, transport, industry, etc.). Other methods could provide additional
insights, including, for instance, expert interviews with CEOs or company experts. These could
contribute to MCA by finding out from experts how potential business models are assessed from a
company perspective.
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